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In this article, I aim to shed new light on the state of populism by looking beyond the 
substance of recent populist movements to examine their form.  I argue that new populism, 
which is characterized by instantaneousness and simultaneity made possible by social media 
and other communications technologies, betrays a pathology of instantaneous democracy in 
its pursuit of unmediated politics at the expense of democratic representation and deliberation.  
To show how new populism poses a fundamental challenge to constitutional democracy, I first 
bring the unnoticed double structure of articulated politics at the heart of constitutional 
democracy to the fore: the structural articulation of distinct stages of decisionmaking in the 
multistage process of constitutional governance and that of formal constitutionalized powers 
and unformed public opinions.  As the double structural articulation assumes a temporal gap, 
first, between each stage of formal decisionmaking, and, second, between opinion-formation 
and policymaking, I then discuss how this assumed temporal gap is being virtually obliterated 
amidst the wave of new populism, shaking the structure of articulated politics to its 
foundations.  In response, I suggest that democratic learning, aided by tactics of judicial 
deceleration before the figuring out of a grand strategy, is critical in combating new populism.   
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“Populism talks” come and go.  Since it first appeared in the nineteenth-century Russia, 
the world has seen waves of populism. 1   Subsumed under the fashionable label “new 
populism,” the political tides foregrounded by the Brexit referendum, Donald Trump’s election 
victory, and the surge of radical parties from Greece to Poland heralded the latest round of 
populism talk.2  To fight back against the tide of populist sentiments, it has been argued that 
the right mix of sensible policies and institutional responses is required, including 
constitutional safeguards against populist attempts to perpetuate political domination through 
anticonstitutionalist constitutional entrenchment.3  Defending democratic institutions with 
better constitutional design has been the shared conviction of generations of public lawyers at 
least since Weimar Germany.4  Through this lens, there is nothing new about the latest surge 
of populism except that it is the most recent arrival in the ebb and flow of right-wing populist 
                                                 
1 PIERRE ROSANVALLON, COUNTER-DEMOCRACY: POLITICS IN AN AGE OF DISTRUST 265 (Arthur 
Goldhammer trans., 2008); JAN-WERNER MÜLLER, WHAT IS POPULISM? 18 (2016). 
2 Notably, left-wing populist movements in Latin America had been underway before the current populism 
talk came to the fore.  MÜLLER, supra note 1. 
3 See, e.g., David Landau, Abusive Constitutionalism, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 189 (2013); Aziz Z. Huq & 
Tom Ginsburg, How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy, 65 UCLA L. REV. 78, 118-37 (2018).  In his recent 
book, Pierre Rosanvallon attributes the structural cause of populism to what he calls the “presidentialization-
personalization” of the executive power in constitutional democracies.  PIERRE ROSANVALLON, GOOD 
GOVERNMENT: DEMOCRACY BEYOND ELECTIONS 11-15, 45-113, 215-19 (Malclom DeBevoise trans., 2018). 
4 See DAVID DYZENHAUS, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY: CARL SCHMITT, HANS KELSEN AND HERMANN 
HELLER IN WEIMAR 127-29 (1997). 
 3 
tides.5     
That is not the lens through which I read new populism in this article.  Looking beyond 
the substance of populist movements to examine their form,6 I aim to show a new development 
in populism by drawing out its characteristic features shared by some of recent populist 
movements.  As I shall further discuss, the new development is characterized by its 
simultaneous politics driven by social media and other instantaneous communications 
technologies, 7  posing a novel challenge to constitutional democracy other than the 
exclusionary form of identity politics and the anticonstitutionalist institutional entrenchment 
as shown in traditional populist movements. 8   Betraying the pathology of instantaneous 
democracy, new populism is new because it not only throws what William Scheuerman calls 
“social acceleration”9 into sharp relief but also brings the question of what I call the “structural 
articulation” in constitutional democracy into the limelight. 
Specifically, I aim to achieve two goals through examining new populism.  The first is 
to bring the double structural articulation in constitutional democracy to the fore.  As I shall 
argue, constitutional democracy is premised on the structure of articulated politics in the sense 
                                                 
5 With the recent examples of populism in mind, Jan-Werner Müller defines populism as an antielitist, 
antipluralist movement of exclusionary identity politics.  MÜLLER, supra note 1, at 2-4.   
6 For a substance-oriented observation of recent populist movements, see MÜLLER, supra note 1. 
7 Jeffrey A. Gottfried et al., The Changing Nature of Political Debate Consumption: Social Media, 
Multitasking, and Knowledge Acquisition, 34 POL. COMM. 177 (2017). 
8 Notably, the feature of exclusionary identity politics tends to make populism inseparable from right-wing 
political movements as it more often than not demonizes immigrants, racial minorities, and other marginalized 
groups as alien intruders.  Yet, as Müller rightly points out, left-wing populism also evokes exclusionary 
identity politics, though the focus is on class.  See id. at 31-34, 73-74.  Centering on the substantive feature of 
exclusionary identity politics, however, Müller’s critique of recent populist movements merges into those that 
are directed against totalitarian ideologies.   
9 WILLIAM SCHEUERMAN, LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND THE SOCIAL ACCELERATION OF TIME 9-23 (2004).  
See also HIGH-SPEED SOCIETY: SOCIAL ACCELERATION, POWER, AND MODERNITY (Hartmut Rosa & William E. 
Scheuerman eds., 2008). 
 4 
that first, constitutional decisionmaking is a multistage process with individual stages 
articulated to each other.  The second structure of articulated politics exists between the 
formal constitutionalized powers and the people’s unformed public opinions.  Unformed 
opinions are that into which formal powers tap for political replenishment so much so that both 
are articulated to each other and integral to constitutional democracy.  My second goal is to 
shed light on how structural articulation works and why new populism as the pathology of 
instantaneous democracy poses a fundamental challenge to constitutional democracy.  I shall 
argue that both structures of articulation work on the assumption that there exists a temporal 
gap and distinction, first, between each stage of formal decisionmaking, and, second, between 
the incubation of opinions and the formation of policies.  Yet, that assumed temporal gap and 
distinction is being virtually obliterated amidst the wave of new populism.  With democracy 
becoming instantaneous at the expense of democratic representation and deliberation, the 
structure of articulated politics is shaken to its core.  To counter new populism, I draw on the 
idea of democratic learning, suggesting a response underpinned by “judicial deceleration.” 
To probe the profound challenges new populism poses to the double structure of 
articulated politics,10 I first provide a diagnosis of the move towards instantaneous democracy 
as embodied in new populism in Section 2.  Following the discussion of the premised 
structure of articulated politics in constitutional democracy and the impact of instantaneous 
                                                 
10 For a discussion of how instantaneousness and simultaneity driven by social acceleration affects the 
temporal assumption of liberal democracy, see SCHEUERMAN, supra note 9.  Besides, time has been studied as 
an institution and a resource in governance scholarship.  See Michael Howlett & Klaus H. Goetz, Introduction: 
Time, Temporality and Timescapes in Administration and Policy, 80 INT’L REV. ADMIN. SCI. 477 (2014).  See 
also Klaus H. Goetz, Time and Power in the European Commission, 80 INT’L REV. ADMIN. SCI. 577 (2014); 
Klaus H. Goetz & Jan-Hinrik Meyer-Sahling, Political Time in the EU: Dimensions, Perspectives, Theories, 16 
J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y. 180 (2009).     
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democracy on it in Section 3, I further explore how the idea of “deceleration” can shed light 
on responsive strategies to mitigate the effect of instantaneousness in Section 4.  By 
decelerating instantaneous democracy through the judicial proceedings, I argue, the learning 
function of democracy can be revitalized and given a role in the battle against new populism. 
2. A (FOOL’S) DEMOCRATIC DREAM COME TRUE: 
AUTHENTICITY, INSTANTANEOUSNESS, AND NEW POPULISM  
From Juan and Eva Peron’s appeal to class-transcendent masses to European radical 
parties’ disdain for the Brussels expertocracy, all the populist movements, past and present, 
tap into antiestablishment sentiments.11  It is not only true on both sides of the Atlantic.  
Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s dethroning of the Kemalists in Turkey and Rodrigo Duterte’s 
sneering at the human rights values established by the 1986 Filipino People Power also appeal 
to the popular distrust of established institutions and conventional opinion leaders.  Yet 
antiestablishment passion alone does not bring about the political phenomenon of populism.  
Underneath the widely shared antiestablishment feelings is broad dissatisfaction with the status 
quo of democracy.12  When the government fails to deliver what the people have hoped for, 
they naturally seek change.  What differentiates populist sentiments from the periodic 
disappointment at the performance of democratically elected governments is that the people 
turn to populist political movements when they are not only discontent with the policy results 
of democratic institutions but also feel disenchanted with the institutions themselves.13     
                                                 
11 MÜLLER, supra note 1, at 1; Robert R. Barr, Populists, Outsiders and Anti-Establishment Politics, 15 
PARTY POL. 29, 31 (2009). 
12 See also Barr, supra note 11, at 32. 
13 Id. 
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Nevertheless, blaming the unhappy life condition on democratic institutions does not give 
the full picture of populism.  For example, antidemocratic forces such as ambitious coup 
plotters in the military and enthusiasts of revolutionary politics of movement parties may make 
pitches to those who have been devastated by a lost war, for example, and therefore lost faith 
in democracy.  In those cases, elections are cancelled and democracy is displaced by military 
dictatorship or revolutionary one-party rule.  Dictatorship poses an existential threat to 
democracy for sure and the latter may degenerate into the former if we are banal about 
democratic institutions but it is hard to mistake one for the other.14 
Juxtaposed against the conspicuousness of antidemocratic forces such as military coup 
plotters or one-party rule revolutionaries, the semblance of democracy makes populism 
deceptively enchanting.  For this reason, the challenge populism poses towards constitutional 
democracy is subtle and even more fundamental.15  Like coup plotters or revolutionaries, 
populists do blame democratic institutions for a lost war, a miserable economy, or other 
difficulties in daily lives.  In contrast to those antidemocratic forces, however, populist 
movements fall short of challenging the core institution of democracy, i.e., election, 
existentially, at least when they are emerging from crowds. 16   Rather, they attack the 
institutional players in electoral democracy such as political parties, mass media, and other 
mediating institutions in democracies for their intermediary role in the formation of the general 
                                                 
14 See Mike Alvarez et al., Classifying Political Regimes, 31 STUD. COMP. INT’L DEV. 3, 4 (1996). 
15 Cf. Paul Taggart, Populism and the Pathology of Representative Politics, in DEMOCRACIES AND THE 
POPULIST CHALLENGE 62, 79 (Yves Mény & Yves Surel eds., 2002). 
16 Jules Coleman & John Ferejohn, Democracy and Social Choice, 97 ETHICS 6, 14 (1986).  This point also 
suggests that it would be hasty to assume that all branches of constitutional power become equally authoritarian 
once a populist politician is elected.  That assumption obscures the subtlety of how populist politics works.   
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will, if you will.17  These democratic intermediaries filter out the authentic choices from the 
people, turning democracy into the instrumentality of the privileged sectors of society, allege 
populists.  If election is a necessary condition for democracy as Robert Dahl contended,18 
populist movements noticeably blame democratic institutions but fall short of assaulting 
democracy in the way dictatorship or totalitarianism does.19   
The foregoing discussion shows that populism appeals to antiestablishment feeling and 
attributes the miserable policy results of an elected government to its democratic institutions 
without rejecting the core institution of election in a constitutional democracy.  Why then do 
parties and other mediating institutions become the target in the populist reaction to the status 
quo of democracy?  The answer needs to be understood through the populist prism: Mediating 
institutions are the root cause of democracy’s failure to give voice to the authentic opinions of 
the people.  At first sight, that looks no different from a restatement of the classical principal-
agent question in political representation. 20   Yet what sets populism apart from other 
responses to the agency problem in democracy is its appeal to authenticity.21  To see this 
point, let us take a closer look at what representation looks like in the eyes of populists.22 
As far as political representation is concerned, a populist politician does not claim to 
better represent the people in the sense that he interprets what the people say and think more 
                                                 
17 Taggart, supra note 15, at 71-75. 
18 ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 128-32 (1956).   
19 Müller discusses how populists rationalize their “failure” to win elections but falls short of explaining why 
populists choose to participate in the electoral mechanism in the first place.  See MÜLLER, supra note 1, at 27, 
29-30, 66-69. 
20 See HANNA F. PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 47-48, 109-10, 121-25 (1972). 
21 Ben Stanley, The Thin Ideology of Populism, 13 J. POL. IDEOLOGIES 95, 104 (2008).  See also MÜLLER, 
supra note 1. 
22 ROSANVALLON, supra note 1, at 267; Taggart, supra note 15, at 71-75. 
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faithfully and renders it in wiser policy choices.  Rather, he professes to re-present (or rather 
“instantiate”) the authentic will of the people through his acts and moreover his character when 
the people are persuaded to identify themselves in the populist movement rallying around 
himself.23  On this view, existing parties are not representative at all but part of the problem 
instead.  In the place of those incorrigible political parties is not just another new party with 
an alternative platform to which constituents would subscribe.  What replaces the old parties 
is the character-defined political movement in which his followers can identify themselves.24  
In terms of Hannah Pitkin’s typology of political representation, a populist politician represents 
the people by “standing for” vis-à-vis “acting for” them.25  
By virtue of authenticity, populism dissolves the agency problem.  Yet, to make the 
authenticity appeal work, a populist politician will have to find a direct link between himself 
and the people.26  Through such a link, the populist politician is able to present his personal 
traits as the evidence of authenticity so much so that the people will be led to find themselves 
in the character of the populist leader and thus believe that he is their messenger. 27  
Noticeably, appealing to authenticity does not mean that what a populist politician says means 
little to his targeted audience.  On the contrary, what he tells determines whether the populist 
passion will bring about a successful populist movement or just more empty populism talks.  
To succeed, what a populist politician says needs to fit into the genre of political narratives, 
                                                 
23 See PITKIN, supra note 24, at 241-42; PAUL W. KAHN, THE REIGN OF LAW: MARBURY V. MADISON AND THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICA 193-95 (1997).  Cf. PIERRE ROSANVALLON, DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY: 
IMPARTIALITY, REFLEXIVITY, PROXIMITY 187-202 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 2011). 
24 Seen in this light, Macron and his La République En Marche! are a phenomenon of populism, too.  But 
cf. MÜLLER, supra note 1, at 36-37, 42-43. 
25 See PITKIN, supra note 20, at 60-111. 
26 MÜLLER, supra note 1, at 35-36. 
27 This evokes the idea of “representation as a mirror.”  See ROSANVALLON, supra note 3, at 218.   
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i.e., a story about his personal character.28  This politically constructed character needs to be 
both unique and familiar.  It needs to be unique because only the populist leader is supposed 
to have the right balance of the various traits in his character.29  At the same time, his character 
cannot be unfamiliar.  The politically constructed character will fail to evoke resonance from 
the populist politician’s followers if they are unable to see a bit of themselves reflected in at 
least one of his character traits.30  Thus, the key to the populist political representation lies in 
the “descriptive” correspondence between a populist leader and the followers.31  Through the 
prism of the leader’s politically constructed character, political ideas, policy proposals, and 
reform plans are read.  Ideas, proposals, and plans all fade into his character traits as depicted 
in his personal story.32   
Seen through the lens of authenticity, deliberation becomes the excuse for hesitation on 
decision or aversion of responsibility; free democratic representation turns out to be the grand 
scheme of screening out unwanted opinions; civilities reflected in the political protocols appear 
                                                 
28 This is why political biographies become a fad in election campaigns.  See also Rosa van Santen & 
Liesbet van Zoonen, The Personal in Political Television Biographies, 33 BIOGRAPHY 46 (2011). 
29 Müller fails to see the possibility of “right balance” when he vaguely notes the “charismatic,” 
“extraordinary gifts” of Hugo Chávez.  MÜLLER, supra note 1, at 32-33. 
30 See also Duncan McDonnell, Populist Leaders and Coterie Charisma, 64 POL. STUD. 719, 723-24 (2016).  
Seen in this light, populism is not necessarily tied to political charisma, which is mysterious in nature.  See 
generally Takis S. Pappas, Are Populist Leaders “Charismatic”? The Evidence from Europe, 23 
CONSTELLATIONS 378 (2016).       
31 Pitkin points out two forms of representation by “standing for:” descriptive and symbolic.  See PITKIN, 
supra note 20, at 60-111.  Notably, speaking of “the fascist theory of representation,” she argues that it was an 
instance of symbolic representation.  Id. at 107-11.  See also MÜLLER, supra note 1, at 27-29.   
32 Cf. ROSANVALLON, supra note 23, at 199-200.  Race, language, and ethnicity are the most visible 
markers of political identity and populists tend to align themselves with nationalists, nativists, or even racists.  
CARL SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 247-48 (Jeffrey Seitzer trans., 2008).  Yet populism does not 
necessarily build on racism, nationalism, or other culture-based nativist ideas to be exclusionary.  Class is one 
alternative.  Another is personality, which is antipluralist by definition.  New populism shares aversion to 
diversity and pluralism with other populist movements.  See supra note 8.  Cf. IVAN KRASTEV, AFTER 
EUROPE (2017). 
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as hypocrisy.  All of them are despised as signs of inauthenticity.  Both deliberative and 
representative democracy are seen as the forms of political diversion and thus the failure of 
authenticity.  From the populist perspective, making policies on the basis of authenticity 
unburdened by deliberation or reflection is the ultimate form of politics based on identity, the 
eternal democratic dream worth pursuing.33 
I hasten to add that appealing to authenticity is not what is new about the latest round of 
populism talk.  Rather, populist movements have long spoken the language of political 
identity, longing for authenticity.34  Yet, as noted above, to appeal to authenticity, a direct 
link must be found between the populist leader and the targeted audience.35  Needless to say, 
like all politicians, populists need means of communications and usually speak through a 
medium.  In other words, apart from tapping skillfully into the rich cultural register of 
representation embedded in political history as discussed above, populism needs to find new 
means of direct communications to offer itself as a new politics centering on authenticity when 
political establishments are perceived to fail to act for the people.36 
In the old days, populists had relied on pamphleteering or editorializing to make their 
views known.  Later on, they turned to the radio and TV broadcasting to make appeals to the 
                                                 
33 Compare ROSANVALLON, supra note 23, at 187-88, with SCHMITT, supra note 32, at 239-49.  See also 
ROSANVALLON, supra note 1, at 267.  
34 Francisco Panizza, Introduction: Populism and the Mirror of Democracy, in POPULISM AND THE MIRROR 
OF DEMOCRACY 1 (Francisco Panizza ed., 2005). 
35 See MÜLLER, supra note 1, at 35-36. 
36 From a historico-sociological perspective, populism can be examined as the complex process of the 
institutional change of constitutional democracy.  See Peter L. Lindseth, Between the ‘Real’ and the ‘Right’: 
Explorations along the Institutional–Constitutional Frontier, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE RULE OF LAW: 
BRIDGING IDEALISM AND REALISM 60, 62-74 (Maurice Adams et al. eds., 2017).  I am indebted to Peter 
Lindseth for this insightful observation.   
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people.  Of course, they also made appearances in mass political rallies from time to time.  
Yet, at most times, the politicians who appealed to authenticity only found their messages 
mediated through some medium.  After making their authenticity appeals, populist politicians 
had to wait and rely on the media to spread the word.  In the meantime, political dynamics 
did not stop for the word to spread out and some unexpected events might intervene.  This 
temporal gap has been the structural constraint on appeals to authenticity.37  Situated in the 
mediated form of politics, the populist leader lacked full control over the means to make the 
people identify themselves with him.  Deficiencies of direct links set the populist leader and 
the people apart.  This explains why populism talks abounded in history but only a few ended 
up as successful political movements and why blood and genes were central to the antipluralist 
construction of identity in past waves of populism.   
Yet, with the coming of the age of social media, the wait ends and the intermediary media 
become dispensable.38  Now politicians find the missing direct link with the people through 
the Internet.  In the real world, they may be distant and disconnected from each other.  In 
the virtual space, however, politicians and the people can bond together by a simple finger 
touch thanks to the advance of communications technologies.  Moreover, it is no accident that 
in contrast to the conventional wisdom that the charismatic populist leader stands as the 
authentic symbol of the People’s assumed moral impeccability,39 a modicum of vulgarity 
                                                 
37 This suggests a fourth dimension of political time that exists alongside the dimensions of polity, politics, 
and policy as proffered by Goetz and Meyer-Sahling.  Goetz and Meyer-Sahling, supra note 10, at 184-91.  
38 See David Ingram & Asaf Bar-Tura, The Public Sphere as Site of Emancipation and Enlightenment: A 
Discourse Theoretic Critique of Digital Communication, in RE-IMAGINING PUBLIC SPACE: THE FRANKFURT 
SCHOOL IN THE 21ST CENTURY 69 (Diana Boros & James M. Glass eds., 2014).  See also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, 
#REPUBLIC: DIVIDED DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA (2017). 
39 Compare MÜLLER, supra note 1, at 27-29, with Pappas, supra note 30.   
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usually comes with a new populist movement.  With the pervasive simultaneity of political 
communications, politics has been more or less demystified and become transparent.40  As a 
result, current populist movements in established democracies seem to benefit more from their 
successes in popular resonance than from their appeals to the mysterious character of political 
charisma.41  Viewed thus, authenticity is not necessarily attached to political messianism in 
new populism, while blood and genes are no longer the predominant vectors of identity politics 
throughout current populist movements.42  In other words, vulgarity is not always anathema 
to a new populist movement but can rather be presented as the evidence of the authenticity of 
its populist leader.  In the shared, not so sophisticated, but unfiltered daily character traits the 
populist leader and his targeted people seem to find each other.  The former is not just a 
symbol of the latter’s political identity.  Rather, both are descriptive of each other.43  This is 
the current form in which new populists stand for the people. 
To be clear, not all politicians are turning themselves into populists, not to mention right-
wing demagogues, in the age of social media.44  Nor do I suggest that vulgarity is what defines 
new populism.  Nevertheless, the political landscape pervaded by social media is layered with 
the soil for the flowering of populism in which showmanship appears to characterize new 
populist politicians better than charisma does.45  It is also worth noting that the direct link 
                                                 
40 Cf. STEFAN HERBRECHTER, POSTHUMANISM: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 179-94 (2013). 
41 Cf. Pappas, supra note 30. 
42 Rodrigo Duterte’s “penal populism” in the Philippines is one example.  Nicole Curato, Politics of 
Anxiety, Politics of Hope: Penal Populism and Duterte’s Rise to Power, 35 J. CURRENT SOUTHEAST ASIAN 
AFF., no. 3, 2016, at 91, 94. 
43 For further discussion of “descriptive representation,” see Pitkin, supra note 24, at 60-91. 
44 Barack Obama once contested the meaning of populism, contending that he represented “real” populism.  
See David Von Drehle, Barack Obama Reveals His Populist Blind Spot, TIME, Jun. 30, 2016, 
http://time.com/4389939/barack-obama-donald-trump-populism/.  
45 Compare McDonnell, supra note 30 with John B. Judis, Us v. Them: The Birth of Populism, THE 
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between politicians and the people being made possible by social media and other 
communications gadgets is not a one-way traffic.  Not only do politicians appeal to the people 
directly but the people also press politicians and communicate among themselves unaided by 
traditional media.  From out of this reconfigured relationship between the politicians and the 
people, we see emerging new populist leaders who appeal by standing for the people in the 
descriptive sense as noted above instead of standing above the people as the political symbol 
of moral integrity as seen in traditional populist movements.  Moreover, the link between 
politicians and the people becomes one of not only directness but also immediacy thanks to the 
innovation of social media.  Taken together, the age of social media redefines political 
temporality by accelerating the tempo of democratic processes, heralding the arrival of 
instantaneous democracy.46     
The democracy of instantaneousness brings about a new political landscape.  On the one 
hand, it releases the untapped political energy in democratic societies, suggesting a more 
responsive and unmediated form of politics.  On the other hand, instantaneousness unleashes 
the spell of authenticity.47  In the eyes of populists, this appears to be a democratic dream 
come true. 48   The feature of instantaneousness breathes new life to populism.  New 
populism points in the direction of unmediated politics.       
3. THE QUESTION OF STRUCTURAL ARTICULATION: 
GOVERNANCE UNDER INSTANTANEOUS DEMOCRACY 
                                                 
GUARDIAN, Oct. 13, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/oct/13/birth-of-populism-donald-trump. 
46 See also SCHEUERMAN, supra note 9. 
47 See id. at 195-217. 
48 Cf. ROSANVALLON, supra note 23, at 123-27, 132, 134. 
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Though instantaneousness is what accounts for the newness in the current wave of 
populist movements as it suggests the immediacy of communication and brings fresh impetus 
to the populist pursuit of authenticity, the central questions of new populism as a political 
phenomenon remain unanswered.  In what way and to what extent does the instantaneousness 
of new populism impact on constitutional democracy?  Is unmediated politics a problem at 
all?  To assess the state of democratic institutions in the shadow of instantaneous democracy, 
we need to take a step back to look at the structure of constitutional governance more closely.49 
3.1. The Double Structure of Articulation 
One of the major achievements of modern constitutionalism is to tame political power 
through a constitutional framework.  To cut the long story short, in the face of the autonomous 
political power unleashed by the progress from premodern feudalism to modern sovereignty, 
modern constitutions emerged as the solution to the issues arising from the dominant role of 
the government in steering social relations.50  Modern constitutionalism aims to maintain the 
state’s political autonomy without reducing the energetic civil society to the government’s 
subsidiary.51  To this end, the political power is framed within a “constitutional form.”52  
                                                 
49 It is worth noting that Scheuerman has looked into the implications of instantaneousness and simultaneity 
to liberal democracy before the rise of social media.  Situated in the pre-social media era, he pinned hopes for 
more responsive politics on the regulation of the commercialization and monopoly of mass media without 
considering the prospect of unmediated politics resulting from the prevalence of social media. SCHEUERMAN, 
supra note 9, at 202-09.  Though I agree with his diagnosis of social acceleration, my present focus is on the 
pathological consequences when populists ride the wave of speedier social acceleration in the age of social 
media. 
50 See DIETER GRIMM, CONSTITUTIONALISM: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 6-15 (2016). 
51 See id. at 27-28, 63-64; ERNST-WOLFGANG BÖCKENFÖRDE, STATE, SOCIETY AND LIBERTY: STUDIES IN 
POLITICAL THEORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 26-46 (J.A. Underwood trans., 1991); N.W. BARBER, THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 17-33 (2010). 
52 See Martin Loughlin & Neil Walker, Introduction, in THE PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: 
CONSTITUENT POWER AND CONSTITUTIONAL FORM 1, 1-3 (Martin Loughlin & Neil Walker eds., 2007). 
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The scope of government power is thus delimited to allow for the free space of civil society in 
the refounding of the political power on the constitutional ground.53  Paralleling the framing 
of the political power, citizens are expected to become part of the collective authorship of the 
laws that steer their lives through the representative government organization under the modern 
constitutional project.54  For this reason, the exercise of government power is divided among 
three (or more) separate governmental departments, which jointly work towards the realization 
of political self-determination.55   
Read in this light, the constitutional design of separation of powers appears to be 
centering on the division of government power, with an eye to preventing the emergence of 
the unlimited and uncontrollable state.  The division (or separation) of powers into the three 
branches (or stages) of administration, legislation, and adjudication is thus associated with the 
idea of limited government.56  Jeremy Waldron finds such explanations unsatisfactory or 
incomplete.57  Instead, he seeks to redefine separation of powers as a constitutional design of 
“articulated governance” and to explain its structure through the lens of how political power is 
channeled into constitutional governance. 58   In this light, the constitutional design of 
separation of powers will turn out to pivot on a structure of articulation, not separation.   
To start with, as the tripartite separation of powers suggests, constitutional governance 
                                                 
53 See ULRICH K. PREUSS, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION: THE LINK BETWEEN CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
PROGRESS 2-4, 52-53 (Deborah Lucas Schneider trans., 1995).  
54 See GRIMM, supra note 50, at 27-32.  See also Paul W Kahn & Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Statutes and 
Democratic Self-Authorship, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 115 (2014). 
55 See CHRISTOPH MÖLLERS, THE THREE BRANCHES: A COMPARATIVE MODEL OF SEPARATION OF POWERS 
51-109 (2013).   
56 E.g., CARL JOACHIM FRIEDRICH, LIMITED GOVERNMENT: A COMPARISON (1974). 
57 JEREMY WALDRON, POLITICAL POLITICAL THEORY: ESSAYS ON INSTITUTION 49-54 (2016). 
58 Id. at 45, 62-70. 
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comprises the legislative, administrative, and judicial exercise of power.59  Further along this 
line of thinking, Waldron looks beneath its surface and perceptively observes that the exercise 
of power under the tripartite separation of powers can be further divided into ten stages or so.60  
Specifically, to turn an idea into reality, the people must be able to envisage the desired political 
action (I), formulate the action plan as a policy in a legislative bill (II), and enact the policy 
into law through the legislative processes of deliberation and voting (III).  Following its 
enactment, the law needs to be made known to the public so that the people can take the change 
resulting from the new legislation into consideration and adjust their life plans accordingly 
(IV).  In the meantime, the law needs to be communicated to the administration, too, as it has 
to develop strategies for enforcement (V).  Furthermore, disputes are expected to arise when 
the administrative agencies actually implement the enforcement strategies (VI).  Though the 
agencies may take initial decisions as to how to respond in such cases (VII), disputes are likely 
to end up in the court.  The court has to adjudicate on disputes after a series of hearings (VIII 
& IX).  Yet this is not the end of the multistage process of constitutional governance.  After 
the court makes the ruling, to put the initial idea into action requires one more stage in the 
exercise of political power: compliance (X).61  Taken as a whole, constitutional governance 
is a function of the foregoing constitutionally ordered multistage exercise of political power 
through which ideas can be turned into policies and laws are put into action. 
                                                 
59 See MÖLLERS, supra note 55.  Scheuerman schematically ties the institutional separation of 
administration, legislature, and courts to a separation of temporalities into the present, the future, and the past. 
See SCHEUERMAN, supra note 9, at 27-68. 
60 It should be noted that Waldron is ambivalent about how each stage is exactly defined and demarcated 
from others.  See WALDRON, supra note 57, at 64.  
61 Id. at 63-64. 
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Waldron’s in-depth analysis not only illuminates the constitutional channeling of political 
power through a multistage process under the tripartite separation of powers.  Moreover, it 
reveals the structural relationship between individual decisionmaking stages, which lies at the 
heart of constitutional governance.  I have noted that the objective of constitutional 
governance is to turn political visions and ideas into reality through the constitutionally ordered 
exercise of power.  Though an idea or a vision needs to be translated into norms in the first 
place through legislation, administrative acts, or judicial rulings, it needs to be acted out by the 
people in their daily lives in the final analysis.  Thus, apart from norm translation, the peaceful 
and smooth compliance of the idea-turned norms is essential to constitutional governance.  
And, the peaceful and smooth compliance of new norms depends largely on whether they fit 
into the people’s life plans through a reflective process of norm internalization, so to speak.62  
To this end, each stage in the multistage decisionmaking process is distinctive in contributing 
to the “incorporation of new norms into the lives and agency of those who are to be subject to 
them.”63  That is the function of democratic learning embedded in the multistage process of 
constitutional governance.64  On this view, each stage exists in its own right but is articulated 
to others at the same time as it paves the way for the next.  An idea does not turn into reality 
until it goes through the distinct but articulated stages of constitutional decisionmaking.65  
The articulation of the multiple stages of decisionmaking within the constitutional design of 
                                                 
62 See also GRIMM, supra note 50, at 346. 
63 WALDRON, supra note 57, at 64. 
64 Compare PREUSS, supra note 53, at 116-26, with ANDREW ARATO, POST SOVEREIGN CONSTITUTION 
MAKING: LEARNING AND LEGITIMACY 11 (2016). 
65 Not all norm implementations result from administrative enforcement or judicial adjudication.  The 
people may simply act in accordance with new norms. 
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separation of powers is the first underlying structural articulation of constitutional governance. 
To allow the people to internalize the norms through the multistage process, each stage 
must last for a certain period of time instead of existing only at a fleeting moment, suggesting 
that a temporal gap and distinction exists between individual stages.  This is why Waldron 
contends that apart from the reflective internalization of the norms, the multistage process also 
allows the norms themselves to “‘settle in’ and become a basis” on which both the people and 
the government agencies plan their next step in the political life in the face of new norms.66  
The constitutional design of separation of powers works on the assumption that democratic 
decisions are taken over a period of time, not at a transient moment.67  Only at this “stepwise” 
and deliberative tempo can individual stages of the multistage process be articulated to each 
other, thereby new norms being incorporated into the lives and agency of those who are to be 
subject to them.  And, it is in this way that the “stepwise” realization of power in the 
constitutional structure of articulated governance “embodies the concerns about liberty, 
dignity, and respect that the rule of law represents.”68  Viewed thus, separation of powers is 
not only about the constitutional ordering of political power.  It is the institutional kernel of 
constitutional democracy. 
As suggested above, one of the stages in the extended process of constitutional 
governance is to communicate the idea-turned norms to the people so that they can adjust their 
life plans accordingly.  Notably, such communication is anything but unilateral propaganda.  
                                                 
66 WALDRON, supra note 57, at 63-64. 
67 Social acceleration itself puts a structural strain on the multistage process of constitutional governance.  
See also SCHEUERMAN, supra note 9, at 44-60. 
68 WALDRON, supra note 57, at 64.  
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Its success pivots on whether the norms can be effectively incorporated into the people’s daily 
lives and their agency through reflective self-internalization.  The people are not merely the 
passive receivers of the legal precepts in the project of constitutional governance.  Moreover, 
the post-enactment communication is not the only stage in which the people play a political 
role in constitutional governance.  I am not alluding to election.  What I have in mind is the 
people’s input to the envisaging and planning of a political action and their interaction with the 
institutional players through the multistage process.  The people’s multifaceted intervention 
in the constitutional decisionmaking process is an integral part of constitutional governance.69  
Seen in this light, constitutional democracy stands as a political project aimed at striking a right 
balance of democratic legitimacy and distrust of power.70   
As Pierre Rosanvallon notes, historically the people became “politicized” beyond 
bestowing democratic legitimacy on the governing authorities.  Early precedents included the 
“tribunal of ephors,”71 the residual right to resistance,72 and the Athenian political trials.73  
They did not completely disappear from the modern constitutional project.  Instead, 
maintaining distrust of democratically legitimated power, which underlay those historical 
examples, has found its way into the modern constitutional design through the institutions such 
as independent auditing,74 opposition party,75 and recall election.76  All of them work on the 
                                                 
69 See GRIMM, supra note 50, at 27, 63. 
70 See ROSANVALLON, supra note 23, at 137-53.  Cf. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A 
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1981). 
71 See ROSANVALLON, supra note 1, at 91-92, 131-33. 
72 See id. at 125-31. 
73 See id. at 195-202. 
74 See id. at 73-74. 
75 See id. at 156-60. 
76 See id. at 207-13. 
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principle of democratic distrust, which keeps vigilance about democracy, 77  holds onto a 
variety of veto powers on democratic decisions,78 and reserves the final judgment to the people 
themselves.79  More important, the people’s intervention does not necessarily take place 
through formal institutions.80  Rather, under the same principle of democratic distrust, the 
people can be politically active through their unformed opinions.  That explains why “public 
opinion” has been variably associated with the concepts of “civic vigilance,” 81  “critical 
sovereignty,”82 and the people’s “judgment” in political theory.83  Those variations on the 
role of the public opinion in democratic societies are evocative of the people’s unformed 
intervention in the multistage process of constitutional governance as a counterbalance to the 
democratically elected government.   
Thus, the people’s multifaceted intervention, often in the name of the (unformed) public 
opinion, which Rosanvallon calls “counter-democracy” (vis-à-vis electoral democracy 
centering on the formal powers in constitutional governance),84 is critical to constitutional 
democracy.  The term “counter-democracy” may be misleading but is suggestive of the 
relationship between the formal powers and the people’s unformed public opinions in 
                                                 
77 See id. at 33-75. 
78 See id. at 179-86. 
79 See id. at 191-93, 214-47.      
80 Drawing on Nicolas de Condorcet’s historical construct of popular sovereignty, Rosanvallon observes of 
plural temporalities in constitutional democracy: the short term, the periodic, and the long term.  
Institutionally, the parliament and the constitutional court embody the periodic and the long-term democracy, 
respectively.  Along these lines, he regards the constitutional court as an institution of reflexivity in 
constitutional democracy.  See ROSANVALLON, supra note 23, at 128-33, 140-47.  The short-term democracy 
is mainly a function of the people’s intervention, which can be reflexive, too, though it is sometimes 
institutionalized as referendum or censure.  See id. at 128, 148. 
81 ROSANVALLON, supra note 1, at 39. 
82 Id. at 169. 
83 Id. at 201. 
84 See id. at 12-18. 
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constitutional democracy.  It is noteworthy that the people’s political intervention through 
unformed public opinions is not “anti-democratic” as it is not antagonistic towards the formal 
constitutional powers. 85   For this reason, public opinions are neither a depoliticized 
expression of personal views nor an antipolitical performance of collective cynicism.  Rather, 
the formal powers and the people’s unformed public opinions are effectively the twin pillars 
of governance under constitutional democracy.  Though they are distinct and rub against each 
other from time to time, they are structurally articulated to ensure the functioning of 
constitutional democracy. 86   Alongside the articulation of the multiple stages of 
decisionmaking within the formal constitutional framing of powers, the dynamic and 
sometimes contentious interaction between the formal powers and the people’s unformed 
public opinions constitutes the second underlying structural articulation of constitutional 
governance. 
3.2. After Articulated Governance 
I have noted that the structural articulation in the multistage process of constitutional 
decisionmaking works on a stepwise and deliberative political tempo as democratic decisions 
are taken over a period of time.  This assumption applies to the second structural articulation, 
too.  To understand why the articulated relationship between the formal powers and the 
people’s unformed public opinions assumes a deliberative tempo, let us first examine the 
current condition of the people’s unformed political intervention instead.   
                                                 
85 See Chantal Mouffe, Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism?, 66 SOC. RES. 745 (1999). 
86 See ROSANVALLON, supra note 1, at 3-8.  See also ROSANVALLON, supra note 3, at 265.  Cf. GRIMM, 
supra note 50, at 47-48. 
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As discussed above, distrust underlies the people’s intervention through unformed public 
opinions, with an eye to maintaining the balance between democratic legitimacy and distrust 
of power.  Thus, regardless of whether public opinions shape up as civic vigilance, critical 
sovereignty, or the people’s judgment, intervention is supervisory rather than initiatory.  To 
put it differently, the people’s intervention acts like an exercise of the “negative sovereignty” 
of veto power, which dovetails the employment of “positive sovereignty” through the 
democratic decisions of formal powers. 87   As Rosanvallon observes, the articulated 
relationship between negative and positive sovereignty is not always frictionless.88  If public 
oversight, critical sovereignty, and the people’s judgment are detached from the end of 
“protect[ing] the proper functioning of existing organs of government [from corruption]”89 
and become ends in themselves, the balance between people’s unformed public opinions and 
the formal institutions of constitutional democracy would be broken.  Vigilant oversight and 
public criticism would no longer be the expression of increasing citizen activism but rather 
become the rejectionists’ means of institution heckling and wrath venting,90 while judgment, 
or rather, judgmental citizenship, would only serve to avoid making decisions and dodging 
responsibility instead of enhancing the political responsibility of decisionmaking.91  As a 
whole, the people’s unformed public opinions would turn into disruptive forces for the formal 
institutions of constitutional governance.  In that scenario, the government may be more 
exposed and appear more “visible” but less “legible” with incessant online polling emerging 
                                                 
87 See ROSANVALLON, supra note 1, at 121-22, 159-60, 302-04. 
88 See id. at 299-303. 
89 ROSANVALLON, supra note 3, at 265. 
90 See ROSANVALLON, supra note 1, at 186-190.   
91 See id. at 271-72. 
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as the new fashion of opinion formation.92  As a result, the people’s unformed public opinions 
would no longer be that into which the formal powers could tap for political replenishment but 
instead become “unpolitical,” if not antipolitical.93   Not much to anyone’s surprise, that 
scenario is not imaginary.  It is the current condition of counter-democracy as diagnosed by 
Rosanvallon.94 
It is beyond the scope of the present article to pinpoint the causes of the mutation of 
counter-democracy or as I call it, the people’s unformed public opinions.  Yet it is obvious 
that empowered by new communications media, the people are now able to intervene in the 
positive exercise of political power at any stage in the multistage process of constitutional 
governance immediately to such an extent that the line is becoming blurred between the formal 
powers and the unformed public opinions, the two sides of constitutional democracy. 95  
Institutional decision and public reaction are taking place virtually synchronously.  
“[I]mprisoned in the immediate,”96 the current interaction between the formal powers and the 
people’s unformed opinions suggests an instantaneous decisionmaking style, displacing the 
stepwise and deliberative political tempo that is critical to norm translation and internalization 
in constitutional governance.  The distinction between the incubation of opinions and the 
                                                 
92 See ROSANVALLON, supra note 3, at 157-59, 184-85, 201-02. 
93 See ROSANVALLON, supra note 1, at 253-64, 283-89. 
94 “Populism radicalizes the three forms of counter-democracy [, namely,] the democracy of oversight, 
negative sovereignty, and politics as judgment.”  Id. at 267-68.  In his recent book on good government, 
Rosanvallon noticeably shifts emphasis from the principle of distrust underpinning his concept of “counter-
democracy” to how civic groups can contribute to the reconstruction of trust in democracy.  See 
ROSANVALLON, supra note 3, at 202-05, 265-66. 
95 ROSANVALLON, supra note 1, at 271.  This suggests the tactics that can be deployed by opposition 
populists to undermine the articulated structure of constitutional governance.   
96 Id.  See ROSANVALLON, supra note 3, at 201-02. 
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formation of policies is being virtually obliterated.97  Unformed public opinions thus fall far 
short of serving as the safety valve of electoral democracy but become an end in itself.  As a 
result, civic vigilance degenerates into the habitual derision of politics;98 the defensive veto 
points as the antidote of “critical sovereignty” to the government result in the perpetuation of 
political gridlocks;99 democratic judgment is turned into a politics of accusation instead of 
deliberative judgment through adversarial processes.100  Worse yet, the unending, rapid, mass 
flow of unformed opinions can easily flood the available sources of information with fake 
news, overpowering conventional media’s function of filtering out misinformation and 
disinformation.101 
From the pathology of “counter-democracy” as discussed above, we can infer reversely 
that in its healthy state, the structural articulation of the formal powers and the people’s 
unformed public opinions works on a more deliberative political tempo.  In other words, for 
the government, being responsive is good but hyper-responsiveness without reflection would 
be a godsend to new populists, lending a helping hand to unmediated politics inadvertently.102  
Corresponding to the articulation of the multiple stages of decisionmaking within the formal 
constitutional powers, the second structural articulation also works on the assumption that a 
certain period of time exists between the institutionalized exercise of political power and the 
                                                 
97 See generally J.M. Balkin, How Mass Media Simulate Political Transparency, 3 J. CULTURAL VALUES 
393 (1999). 
98 See ROSANVALLON, supra note 1, at 268-70. 
99 See id. at 270-71. 
100 See id. at 271-73.  The tendency towards the criminalization of political responsibility can be seen as 
another sign of this development.  See ROSANVALLON, supra note 3, at 180-81. 
101 See Hunt Allcott & Matthew Gentzkow, Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election, 31 J. ECON. 
PERSPECTIVES 211 (2017). 
102 But cf. SCHEUERMAN, supra note 9, at 202-17. 
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unformed intervention from the people.  Taken together, the double structural articulation of 
constitutional governance as discussed above works on an assumed stepwise and deliberative 
political tempo.   
If both the first and second structural articulation assume the same stepwise and 
deliberative political tempo, the disruption the emerging instantaneous decisionmaking style 
causes to the second structural articulation is likely to bear on the first.  It is true that the 
multistage process of constitutional governance remains unchanged in form.  We are still able 
to trace the steps a political idea takes towards its translation into reality through the multistage 
process.  Yet the radicalization of the people’s unformed public opinions also threatens to 
render the process of constitutional governance being multistage in name only.   
As noted above, the people’s intervention in the multistage process of constitutional 
governance through unformed public opinions has found itself “imprisoned in the immediate” 
so much so that the institutional decision and the public reaction seem to be synchronized.  
That not only affects the structural articulation between the formal constitutional powers and 
the people’s unformed public opinions.  Facing the same radicalized and incessant citizen 
surveillance and critical judgment, the distinctive stages in the process of constitutional 
decisionmaking are at the risk of merging into a single, mixed stage, so to speak. 103  
Moreover, in the instantaneous style of democratic governance, the formal powers are not 
always in thrall to the people.104  Rather, the people’s unformed public opinions can be 
instrumental for the institutional players of distinctive stages to free themselves of the 
                                                 
103 Cf. ROSANVALLON, supra note 23, at 221-24. 
104 See Balkin, supra note 97. 
 26 
institutional constraints inherent in the multistage decisionmaking process.  By going directly 
to the people, for example, the government can bring external pressure to bear on the legislature 
and other institutional players to push through its preferred policy or to obstruct the deliberative 
processes.  The Trumpian presidency shows how the administration-legislature interaction 
can be twisted by the Commander-in-Chief’s flowing Twitter tweets.105  In a nutshell, the 
separation of powers is struggling in the instantaneousness of the new political landscape.  
I hasten to add that the blurring of the distinction between individual stages of the exercise 
of power is not the only result of the emptying of separation of powers under instantaneous 
democracy. 106   Driven by such an instantaneous temporality, individual stages of the 
multistage process of constitutional decisionmaking are seemingly converted into the real-
world stages on which politics is being hyper-dramatized.107  Yet what is resulting from those 
political dramas is far from an Arendtian republic of theatricality-guided political actions.108  
Instead, the exercise of political power is virtually turned into an endless careless reality show, 
only to find itself in the same unpolitical/ antipolitical genre as the mutated, radicalized 
unformed public opinions.109  Moreover, the expected “settle in” effect as a function of the 
                                                 
105 E.g., Alex Shephard, The GOP Needs Trump’s Tweets, NEW REPUBLIC, July 6, 2017, 
https://newrepublic.com/article/143727/gop-needs-trumps-tweets.  
106 See SCHEUERMAN, supra note 9, at 44-68, 80-97, 117-43. 
107 See also Balkin, supra note 97. 
108 See DANA R. VILLA, POLITICS, PHILOSOPHY, TERROR: ESSAYS ON THE THOUGHT OF HANNAH ARENDT 
128-54 (1999). 
109 Brexit and the Trumpian presidency are good examples of the “unpolitical,” if not antipolitical, character 
of dramatized politics.  For a report on the “game” mentality of some prominent “Leave” leaders in their 
campaign for Brexit, see Nick Cohen, There Are Liars and Then There’s Boris Johnson and Michael Gove, THE 
GUARDIAN, June 25, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jun/25/boris-johnson-michael-
gove-eu-liars.  As regards the Trumpian presidency, the inclusion of the president’s family members in the 
White House staff and the seemingly unending replacement of presidential advisers and other officials bears a 
bizarre resemblance to “The Apprentice” series hosted by the then showman Trump.  Cf. Courtney Weaver, 
Drama Is Struggling to Match the Reality of Donald Trump, FINANCIAL TIMES, July 31, 2017, 
https://www.ft.com/content/34120632-75d7-11e7-90c0-90a9d1bc9691.   
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designed multistage process of constitutional decisionmaking is also fading away because of 
the compressed and accelerated decisionmaking style in the new political landscape, throwing 
the values of liberty, dignity, and respect at the core of the rule of law into doubt.110     
In sum, the double structural articulation at the core of the functioning of constitutional 
governance is being eroded by the rising tide of instantaneous democracy.  Under the pressure 
to respond to the hyperactive unformed public opinions, not only are the multiple stages of 
constitutional decisionmaking receding into the background but the formal powers are also 
becoming increasingly indistinct from the people’s unformed opinions.111  As a result, the 
exercise of political power is unleashed from the multistage process of constitutional 
governance, while the balance between the formal powers and the people’s unformed public 
opinions is disrupted.  As instantaneousness continues to displace representation and 
deliberation in constitutional democracy, the unmaking of articulated governance is afoot.112  
This is the fundamental impact new populism is exerting on constitutional democracy.  
4. DECELERATION, DEMOCRATIC LEARNING, AND THE RE-
ARTICULATION OF POLITICAL POWER  
While democracy becomes increasingly instantaneous because of the structural 
transformation of social acceleration,113 the technology-induced instantaneous democracy as 
discussed above allows new populists to blur the formal powers and the people’s unformed 
opinions in the first place and thereby disrupt the multistage formal decisionmaking process.  
                                                 
110 See WALDRON, supra note 57, at 63-64.  
111 See Balkin, supra note 97. 
112 See also ROSANVALLON, supra note 23, at 214-15.   
113 See SCHEUERMAN, supra note 9, at 15-23, 44-68. 
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With the double structure of articulation dismantled, policy claims from new populists can go 
unchecked easily.  Through this lens, politicians’ provocative language and blustering 
rhetoric appear to be the direct challenge from new populism.  Mindful of the populists’ 
occasional unsubstantiated, fear-/hatred-arousing statements, discussion of the current wave of 
populism thus tends to focus on how to dispel popular ignorance with correct information.114  
After all, the “marketplace of ideas” rationale has a long history in justifying freedom of speech 
as the pathway towards truth.115  More important, democracy has been regarded as a reflexive 
process of governance with the function of political learning.116  Through the democratic 
processes, unknown social issues can be detected and policy errors can be learned and 
corrected to address social needs.  From this perspective of epistemic democracy and 
cognitive constitutionalism, 117  the falsehoods created by new populists will eventually 
dissipate, despite the drive for instantaneousness.  Thus, what requires in response to new 
populism is not only to carry out fundamental reforms but also to make them intelligible.118  
Democratic learning appears to be the right answer to new populism.   
Given that new populism is a function of the technology-induced instantaneous 
democracy, however, the answer of democratic learning is incomplete.  The challenges posed 
by new populism and instantaneous democracy do not result from the lack of information or 
                                                 
114 See MÜLLER, supra note 1, at 3-5, 23-24; ROSANVALLON, supra note 1, at 307-10. 
115 E.g., Eugene Volokh, In Defense of the Marketplace of Ideas / Search for Truth as a Theory of Free 
Speech Protection, 97 VA. L. REV. 595 (2011). 
116 See generally Kevin Olsen, Reflexive Democracy as Popular Sovereignty, in NEW WAVES IN POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY 125 (Boudewijn de Bruin & Christopher F. Zurn eds., 2009). 
117 See PREUSS, supra note 53, at 125-26; FRANK I. MICHELMAN , BRENNAN AND DEMOCRACY 54-60 (1999); 
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118 ROSANVALLON, supra note 1, at 307-08. 
 29 
the people’s loss of the desire for knowledge.  The question is how the learning function of 
constitutional democracy can continue to work in the face of the relentless pursuit for 
instantaneousness.119  As discussed above, the fundamental challenge from new populism is 
its unmaking the structure of articulated politics in constitutional democracy as it rides the 
wave of instantaneous democracy to displace the deliberative political tempo.  That suggests 
that the multistage process of constitutional governance and its embedded function of 
democratic learning operate on a particular political temporality.120  If so, we need to consider 
how to restore the disrupted political temporality of constitutional governance so that the 
learning function of constitutional democracy can be revitalized to dispel the popular ignorance 
under the spell of new populism.121   “Deceleration” suggests the direction we can think 
further in conceiving of possible legal responses.         
As suggested above, one of the consequences of the erosion of the multistage process of 
constitutional governance is that a populist head of government can render the deliberative 
function of the legislative body ineffective by appealing directly to the people’s unformed 
opinions.  The populist pressure increases more when the populist head-initiated policy 
proceeds to the implementation stage.122  Will the same trick work with respect to the court 
when disputes arise and come before it?  The answer lies in the judicial proceedings, which 
                                                 
119 This evokes the issues Tim Wu attributes to the scarcity of the attention of listeners in the age of social 
media.  See Tim Wu, Is the First Amendment Obsolete? 2 (The Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia 
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have been noted for their slow pace and invited criticism for that reason. 123   Counter-
intuitively, that inbuilt institutional deficiency of the judicial proceedings can be a structural 
asset of the multistage process of constitutional governance in its pushback against new 
populism. 
In contrast to the political branches, the court is not designed as a responsive institution 
vis-à-vis public opinions.  This by no means suggests that the court is not expected to listen 
to the people but it does mean that the court does not carry out its function in a purely 
responsive way.124  Moreover, unless in the extreme case of an immediate judicial purge 
following the inauguration of the elected populist government and parliament, unelected and 
tenured judges, as an institution, are less vulnerable to the tides of populist vitriol than those 
holding political office.125  My point is that the default slow-paced judicial decisionmaking 
puts the court in a special institutional position to face the populist push.  The slowness of the 
court decision in and of itself is an asset to combat new populism, despite the historical record 
that the court also bowed to populist pressure when push came to shove.126  With the judicial 
proceedings unfolding stepwise, it allows the populist idea-turned legal norms to “settle in.”  
                                                 
123 See SCHEUERMAN, supra note 9, at 42-44.  See also Samuel Issacharoff, Democracy’s Deficits, 85 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 485, 517-18 (2018). 
124 Paul W. Kahn, Independence and Responsibility in the Judicial Role, in TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN 
LATIN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY 73, 74-76 (Irwin P. Stotzky ed., 1993). 
125 See John Ferejohn, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Explaining Judicial Independence, 72 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 353, 356-65 (1999).  To be sure, if we take into account elected judges as adopted in many states 
in the US, the issue will become more complex and the idea of judicial deceleration is likely to be neutered.  
See Adam Liptak, Judges Who Are Elected Like Politicians Tend to Act Like Them, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2016, at 
A12.  Also, this does not tell us whether the court itself is populist in the sense that it decides cases in 
correspondence with public opinion.  See generally Or Bassok, The Supreme Court's New Source of 
Legitimacy, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 153 (2013). 
126 See BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK: PRESERVING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF 
TERRORISM 60-64 (2006); Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095, 
1143-44 (2009). 
 31 
This is critical.   
Specifically, as has been discussed, the temporal gap and distinction between individual 
stages in the multistage decisionmaking process precondition the people’s reflective 
internalization of legal precepts.  Thus, the effect of the new policy enacted in the law does 
not transpire until the law settles in.  Furthermore, only when the effect of the new policy 
fully transpires can the people reflect thoroughly on the legal precept concerned.  Along these 
lines, the people and the politicians can get a better sense of the real-world implications of the 
populist-driven policy and reconsider their attitude towards it accordingly when its unfolding 
effect is continuously reflected upon with the progress of the judicial proceedings.  In other 
words, judicial deceleration can help to restore the rushed process of democratic learning.     
It is true that the court may still uphold the disputed law in the end of the case.  
Nevertheless, its slow pace can buy the democratic society time to reflect and reconsider.127  
To put it bluntly, learning takes time even for quick learners.  Apart from its potential role in 
regenerating democratic learning, deceleration by judicial intervention has further implications 
to the idea of articulated governance in constitutional democracy.  Taking advantage of 
judicial deceleration, opposition forces can mobilize and regroup themselves, (re)opening 
frontiers for new political contests.  The contested policy may well reenter the legislature for 
a new debate or further investigation, suggesting a re-articulation of political power.  With its 
impact on the subsequent parliamentary debate, the post-referendum judicial intervention in 
                                                 
127 Algorithm might be a game changer in this regard.  Yet, as far as democracy is concerned, algorithm 
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the Brexit Question in the UK shows how the court could make a difference in the face of 
populist forces.128       
The pending travel ban case in the US provides another example of how judicial 
deceleration can contribute to the fight against new populism.  Though the Supreme Court 
later ordered to stay the preliminary injunctions issued by two federal district courts with 
respect to the Trump Administration’s most recent travel ban,129 the early judicial intervention 
had helped to expose the problems with the original order to public scrutiny.  Despite the 
likelihood that the Supreme Court may eventually endorse the administration’s revised 
position,130 the litigation itself has allowed the wide range of ramifications of the controversial 
policy to be fully appreciated, leading to the eventual replacement of the flawed original order 
with the most recent revised proclamation.  Granted, the impugned executive order in the 
pending case still contains constitutionally suspicious contents.131  Nevertheless, the fact that 
it results from the White House’s reaction to a series of judicial injunctions on its early versions 
suggests how judicial deceleration can help to put brakes on the populist push. 132   The 
interaction among the administration, the people, and the injunction court can be a back-door 
(partial) substitution for the weakened deliberative function, opening up new possibilities for 
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articulated governance under the pressure of new populism.133 
Neither of the above two examples suggests that we can rest assured that constitutional 
democracy will be fine as the multistage process of constitutional governance has built in 
judicial deceleration for self-preservation.134  Rather, as the travel ban case suggests, the court 
must intervene in time instead of waiting for the case to become ripe.  To play the role of the 
institutional decelerator effectively, the court will have to rebalance its core judicial function 
of judging cases on substance and the less noticed one of issuing early injunctions.  Further 
along these lines, equity will become increasingly important in the judicial function alongside 
the court’s traditional focus on issues concerning legality.135  True, both equity and legality 
have long been the jurisdiction of the court.136  Yet, given the high degree of uncertainty and 
conflicting interests at stake in equitable remedies,137 ordering injunctions may well implicate 
the court in more politically charged issues, intensifying the politicization of the judicial 
branch.138  This concern is fair and should not be taken lightly. 
Yet it should be noted that by the exercise of its injunction power or its classical function 
of deciding the legality or constitutionality of a controversial populist measure, the court is not 
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called upon to substitute its decision for that made through the political process.  What the 
court is expected to do under the guidance of judicial deceleration is not to set aside the 
contested policy or law but rather to make room for the learning function of constitutional 
democracy to play out and the re-articulation of politics by putting brakes on the populist 
feeling-driven decision.  More important, the new constitutional context that calls for 
institutional deceleration works against the conventional wisdom that guided by the virtue of 
prudence, the court had better not intervene in the early stage of the dispute to allow the 
political process to run its course. 139   For one thing, without the court’s injunctive 
intervention, the disputed law that was rushed through the legislative process will come into 
force, compelling the people to comply and thus suffer.  For another, the intensifying effect 
of the court’s intervention through early injunctions should be welcomed as it can be the 
catalyst for a new political dynamic vis-à-vis populist movements.140  Judicial deceleration is 
neither a panacea for populist movements nor a proposal for heroic courts but a plea for the 
judicial aid in fighting new populism with democratic learning.141      
5. CONCLUSION 
Populist movements around the globe in the twenty-first century are a complex political 
phenomenon that defies a common definition.  Their goals are diverse and causes are locally 
determined.  It is also unclear whether all of them are new and to what extent they stand apart 
from the past waves of populism in modern history.  For these reasons, new populism is hard 
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to pin down and how to respond to it is also unclear as the way it challenges constitutional 
democracy remains elusive.   
The political project of constitutional and democratic governance is a complex form in 
which “man’s quest for freedom, emancipation, and autonomy” has been kept alive. 142  
Through my lens, only some of the diverse populist movements subsumed under the rubric of 
new populism appear to be genuinely new to the extent that their political leaders relentlessly 
resort to social media and other instantaneous communications technologies to embrace an 
unmediated politics at the expense of democratic representation and deliberation.  This does 
not tell us whether this new form of populism is more or less dangerous than its more 
conventional counterparts.  Yet it does suggest that it require a more focused prognosis than 
a general response to populism.  Benefiting from the technology-induced instantaneous 
democracy, new populism presents an alternative politics that envisages the displacement of 
constitutional complexity with anti-institutional simplicity.  In this way, new populism 
shakes up the double structure of articulation in the project of constitutional governance and 
blunts the learning function of constitutional democracy, jeopardizing the continuing quest for 
political freedom, emancipation, and autonomy in human history.  It is against that backdrop 
that I have argued that new populism is the pathology of instantaneous democracy. 
In conceiving responsive strategies to mitigate the destructive effect of the instantaneous 
decisionmaking style that bolsters new populists, I have argued that regenerating the learning 
function of democracy is critical in combating the disease of new populism.  Without 
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unplugging social acceleration,143 deceleration suggests the direction we can think further in 
responding to new populism.  As part of the possible cure for the pathology of instantaneous 
democracy, judicial deceleration shows how constitutional governance can give itself a chance 
in the face of the relentless politics of instantaneousness and simultaneity.  Granted, social 
media are only one of the means for new populists to suit their ends and are not necessarily 
antagonistic to democracy.144  Also, to fully address the challenges posed by the technology-
induced instantaneous democracy requires a comprehensive strategy, including the restoration 
of “a vision of a common world” and the defragmentation of public opinions.145  The law’s 
overall role in that comprehensive strategy remains to be seen.146   Even so, democratic 
learning, aided by tactics of judicial deceleration before we figure out that grand strategy, at 
least gives us some hope to save the project of political freedom and constitutional governance 
in the great battle against new populism.  
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